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EVAPORATING INTO THIN AIR: THE
PROSECUTION OF AIR POLLUTION CRIMES
DURING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Joshua Ozymy* & Dr. Melissa Jarrell Ozymy+
Antagonistic to environmental regulation, the Trump Administration sought to
significantly roll back federal clean air law enforcement. Yet, we know very little about the
impact of the Administration on air pollution criminal enforcement. Through content analysis
of all EPA criminal investigations leading to prosecution, we analyze patterns in charging
and sentencing and draw out the broader themes in air pollution prosecutions during this
period. Our results show a sizable drop in prosecutions compared to the Obama
Administration. Although prosecutors managed to pursue serious crimes involving significant
harm and criminal conduct and secure over $2.9 billion in monetary penalties, roughly 160
years of probation, and 146 years of incarceration at sentencing, many of these penalties result
from a few prosecutions. Our conclusions focus on forward-facing solutions for the Biden
Administration to make good on campaign promises to reduce environmental injustice through
enhanced environmental criminal enforcement, community policing and engagement, and
recognition of environmental justice communities as crime victims.

* Dr. Joshua Ozymy is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political
Science and Public Service at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. His research focuses on the
criminal enforcement of environmental law in the United States.
+ Dr. Melissa Jarrell Ozymy is a Professor of Criminal Justice and Head of the Department of
Social, Cultural and Justice Studies at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Her research interests
include criminology, environmental justice, and environmental victimization.
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INTRODUCTION
Donald Trump loved to make public statements denouncing the realities of
climate change and blaming environmental laws for hurting jobs and the economy.1
He promised to give few resources to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and appointed anti-environmentalists, such as Scott Pruitt, to run the agency
to ensure weaker enforcement of environmental laws by EPA, the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ), and other relevant agencies.2 As with many of his Republican
forebearers stretching back to Reagan, Trump was openly hostile to strong
environmental enforcement.3 Because clean air laws and regulations impact the
country’s ability to address climate change, Trump was exceedingly aggressive in
rolling back clean air regulations: he loosened regulations on air pollution, attempted
to weaken federal fuel economy standards, reversed Obama’s Clean Power Plan, and
pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement.4 Whether and how the Trump
Administration impacted the enforcement of federal air pollution laws is still
unclear.5
This article addresses whether and how the Trump Administration
influenced the enforcement of air pollution laws through a comprehensive analysis
of the prosecution of air pollution crimes during the era. Examining all EPA criminal
investigations that lead to prosecution, we analyze charging and sentencing patterns
and draw out the broader themes in such prosecutions during Trump’s term in office.
Our approach allows us to examine whether prosecutions declined, if prosecutors
were able to tackle serious violations of environmental law, what they chose to

1.
See Richard J. Lazarus, The Super Wicked Problem of Donald Trump, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 184143 (2020).
2.
See Jay Michaelson, The Ten Worst Things Scott Pruitt’s EPA Has Already Done, THE DAILY
BEAST (Dec. 29, 2017, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-ten-worst-things-scott-pruittsepa-has-already-done; Bloomberg, The Trump EPA Deals Another Blow to the Environment, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (Sept. 18, 2020, 12:00 PM UTC), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-0918/trump-epa-rule-on-coal-ash-puts-lives-and-the-environment-at-riskError! Hyperlink reference not
valid.; Rebecca Beitsch & Rachel Frazin, Trump Budget Slashes EPA Funding, Environmental Programs,
THE HILL (Feb. 10, 2020, 02:18 PM EST), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/482352trump-budget-slashes-funding-for-epa-environmental-programs.
3.
Jessica Hejny, The Trump Administration and Environmental Policy: Regan Redux?, 8 J. ENV’T
STUD. & SCI., 197, 211 (2018).
4.
The Obama Clean Power Plant attempted to cut carbon emissions from power plants to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from gas and coal plants. See EPA, FACT SHEET: OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2014-05/documents/20140602fs-overview.pdf.
The Paris Agreement is an international agreement for countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See
Melissa Denchak, Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/paris-climate-agreement-everything-you-needknow.
5.
Sarah Gibbins, 15 Ways the Trump Administration Has Changed Environmental Policies,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/15ways-trump-administration-impacted-environment.
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prosecute, and if they were able to obtain significant penalties, despite counter
pressures from the administration.6

I. PRESIDENTS AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The simplistic narrative that Republican presidents hurt the environment
and Democratic ones help it–and further, that those individuals have a direct and
overwhelming influence on administrative outcomes–is not completely accurate.7
Democratic presidents have not always been as supportive of environmental
regulation and enforcement as expected. Bill Clinton failed to strengthen budgets
and enforcement, as his programs were derailed by the Republican takeover of the
House and his impeachment, and while Obama passed a series of ambitious goals,
such as the Paris Agreement and his Clean Power Plan, significant resources for
enforcement failed to materialize.8
Republican Presidents have not always achieved their goals of stripping out
environmental regulatory agencies, and sometimes support can be found in odd
places. While Anne Gorsuch certainly had a negative impact on enforcement
outcomes at EPA, she was removed from her position after being held in contempt
of Congress, and enforcement continued when William Ruckelshaus was restored to
a leadership position, as he had done as the EPA’s inaugural director.9 A
counterintuitive example here would be that the DOJ’s efforts to prosecute
environmental crimes were supported and strengthened during the George W. Bush
Administration.10 Research demonstrates that a greater number of prosecutions were
brought under this Administration than the Obama Administration.11 Our research

6.
For a discussion of enforcement during hostile presidential regimes and how, see James A.
Barnes, Implementing Presidential Policy Agendas Administratively: A View from the Inside, 69 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 586, 594 (2009). See also Richard J. Lazarus, Flexing Agency Muscle?, 48 GA. L. REV. 327, 334 (2014).
7.
Teddy Roosevelt is famous for his conservationism, and Bush helped to overhaul clean air
laws. See Republican Presidents on Environment, NPR (June 3, 2007, 4:34 PM ET), Error! Hyperlink
reference not valid.https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10687339.
8.
See Joel A. Mintz, Neither the Best of Times Nor the Worst of Times: EPA Enforcement During the
Clinton Administration, 35 ENV’T L. REP. 10390, 10412 (2005). For a more recent sense of environmental
enforcement budgets, see U.S. Department of Justice, FY 2021 General Legal Activities - Environment and
Natural Resources Division, https://www.justice.gov/doj/page/file/1246681/download. Budgetary data for
the ENRD is found by searching the DOJ’s Budget and Performance Summary by fiscal year and scrolling
down for the ENRD budget. Prior years to 2015 are found in the Archives. See: U.S. Department of
Justice, 2022, Budget and Performance Summary ENRD (Various Years), Available from:
https://www.justice.gov/doj/budget-and-performance.
9.
Cally Carswell, How Reagan’s EPA Chief Paved the Way for Trump’s Assault on the Agency, THE
NEW REPUBLIC (March 21, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/141471/reagans-epa-chief-paved-waytrumps-assault-agency.
10.

David M. Uhlmann, Strange Bedfellows, 25 ENV’T L.F. 40, 43 (2008).

11. David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime Redux: Charging Trends,
Aggravating Factors, and Individual Outcome Data For 2005-2014, 8 MICH. J. ENV’T & ENERGY L. 297, 313
(2019).
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comparing environmental prosecutions under Bush and Obama shows a similar
pattern.12
Richard Nixon, responding to public outcry over national environmental
problems, consolidated the regulation of various environmental media under the
control of the newly created EPA, while Reagan was more hostile to environmental
regulation, appointing Anne Gorsuch to run the EPA and subsequently reduce its
enforcement program.13 George H.W. Bush was briefly considered to run the agency
and had expressed strong support for environmental protection on more than one
occasion. 14 George H.W. Bush focused on reducing federal oversight of enforcement
efforts, returning power to the states, and relying on political insiders for regulatory
and enforcement decisions.15
The evolution of the federal environmental criminal enforcement system
also began to evolve under Reagan. Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1984, and
they represented the first felony provisions to be included in federal environmental
law.16 The 1980s were a time of global expansion to punish environmental crimes. 17
By the mid-1980s, Congress was pushing for stiffer penalties for a variety of federal
laws, and expanded felony provisions were added to the Clean Water Act (CWA) in
1987 under Reagan, the Clean Air Act (CAA) under Bush in 1990, and later other
federal environmental laws received felony provisions including The Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Acts (FIFRA).18

12. See Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, Wielding the Green Stick: An Examination of Criminal
Enforcement at the EPA under the Bush and Obama Administrations, 24 ENV’T POL. 38, 56 (2015).
13. See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES, 2141 (University of Texas Press, 2012).
14. Brett Milano, The Evolution of American Environmental Law from Nixon to Trump, HARVARD
LAW TODAY (Nov. 7, 2017), https://today.law.harvard.edu/evolution-american-environmental-lawnixon-trump/.
15. Joel A. Mintz, Treading Water: A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the Bush II
Administration, 34 ENV’T L. REP. 10912, 10915 (2004).
16. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). Misdemeanor provisions
stretch back over a century to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403, and the Lacey Act of
1900, 16 U.S.C §§3371-72, but even with the expansion of environment law beginning in the 1970s, felony
provisions did not appear until the 1980s. Neil J. Barker, Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899: Potent Tool for Environmental Protection, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 109, 156 (1976).
17. Michael R. Pendleton, Beyond the Threshold: The Criminalization of Logging, 10 SOC’Y & NAT.
RES. 181, 181-83 (1997).
18. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972); Toxic Substances Control Act, 53 U.S.C. §
2601 (1976); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1972); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1970). For examples of criminal provisions and related punishments in federal
environmental statutes, see Criminal Provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisions-resource-conservation-and-recovery-act-rcra.;
Criminal Provisions of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisionsclean-air-act.
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If Republicans are not always hostile towards environmental enforcement
and Democrats are not always as supportive as expected, how are presidents able to
shape agency enforcement outcomes, particularly for EPA and DOJ, the primary
environmental law enforcement agencies that police and prosecute federal
environmental crimes? Presidents can influence budgets and overall personnel
numbers and make critical appointments that affect the outcomes of these agencies.
But their influence is buttressed in good measure by organizational inertia and agency
prerogatives that may conflict with presidential administrations.19 Having become
accustomed to waffling between a lack of promised support and sometimes open
hostility, career administrators tend to persist in their efforts within EPA and DOJ,
to a degree, despite presidential influence.20
Efforts to devote prosecutorial resources to environmental crimes can be
traced to the founding of the DOJ’s Public Lands Division in 1909, which evolved to
the current Environmental and Natural Resources Division (ENRD).21 The serious
institutionalization of resources for environmental crime prosecutions began to take
shape during the Reagan Era, despite the president’s anti-environmentalism. The
Environmental Crimes Section (DOJ-ECS) was created in 1982 to center personnel
and professional expertise on prosecuting environmental crimes. DOJ-ECS became
its own unit in ENRD in 1987, running parallel to the Environmental Enforcement
Section (EES) that oversees civil-judicial cases.22 Today, DOJ-ECS employs roughly
forty-three prosecutors and a dozen support staff to prosecute environmental
crimes.23
The idea of extracting greater punishments for environmental crimes
enjoyed a brief window of bipartisan consensus in the 1980s, which today seems
somewhat strange.24 As environmental regulation became increasingly defined on
partisan grounds, the conversation shifted from the DOJ not doing enough to
prosecute environmental offenders to doing too much. While prosecutors interpreted
expanded environmental statutes to aid in their prosecution of more complex cases,
their role in shaping the substance of these laws fell into academic debate.25 This

19. Joshua Ozymy, Bryan Menard & Melissa L. Jarrell, Persistence or Partisanship: Exploring the
Relationship between Presidential Administrations and Criminal Enforcement by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1983-2019, 81 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 49-63 (2021).
20.

See Mintz, supra note 15, at 10912, 10930; Uhlmann, supra note 10, at 40-43.

21. History, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ENV’T AND NAT. RES. DIV. (May 18, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history; Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST. ENV’T CRIMES SECTION (May 13, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/enrd/aboutdivision/historical-development-environmental-criminal-law.
22. See An Overview of Our Practice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ENV’T AND NAT. RES. DIV. ENV’T
ENF’T SECTION (EES) (May 14, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/enrd/overview-our-practice.
23. Environmental Crimes Section, U.S. DEP’T
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/environmental-crimes-section.

OF

JUST.

(July

2,

2021),

24. Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions and the Work that Remain, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 901 (1991).
25. See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem
with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L. REV. 867, 867-70 (1994) (discussing the pros and cons of
prosecutorial discretion in shaping federal environmental law).
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debate set the stage for persistent inner-branch conflict over the proper role and
scope of environmental law enforcement agencies.26
Policing resources for the environment began to institutionalize and evolve
under Reagan despite his opposition to the agency. The EPA’s Office of
Enforcement was founded in 1981.27 EPA hired its first full-time criminal
investigators the following year, who were deputized as Special Deputy U.S.
Marshalls, until 1988 when Congress gave them full law enforcement authority.28
Resources for policing federal environmental crimes were further expanded under
Bush in 1990 with the passage of the Pollution Prosecution Act, which created a
statutory minimum and goal of expanding the number of EPA criminal investigators
to at least 200 in the coming years.29 About 145 criminal investigators, also known as
special agents, are currently housed within the Criminal Investigation Division
(EPA-CID).30 EPA-CID agents typically work out of field offices and build cases
from information obtained from whistleblowers, formal documents, civil inspectors,
or other government agencies.31 When they feel they possess sufficient evidence of
an environmental crime, agents work with prosecutors within DOJ-ECS or the U.S.
Attorneys’ Office to file criminal information in an appropriate district court or
convene a grand jury.32
Environmental law enforcement agencies embody a deterrence-based
organizational culture that focuses on pursuing and punishing crimes involving
significant harm and culpable conduct, with the goals of extracting sufficient
punishment and deterring future offenders.33 However, most violations of

26. Theodora Galactos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case
Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 590 (1995).
27. The Office evolved into the modern Office of Compliance Assurance (OECA). See About the
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), EPA, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-officeenforcement-and-compliance-assurance-oeca.
28. Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r of the EPA Off. of Enf’t and
Compliance Assurance, to the Off. of Crim. Enf’t, Forensics and Training (Dec. 15, 2003),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-review03.pdf.
29.

The Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 2962 (1990).

30. The number of special agents varies depending on the source and whether one is considering
those exclusively dedicated to criminal investigation or other support staff. See U.S. EPA, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: AMERICA’S
ENVIRONMENTALCRIMEFIGHTERS,https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceftbroc
hure.pdf; EPA CID Agent Count, PUB. EMPLS. FOR ENV’T RESP. (2019), https://www.peer.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/11_21_19-Federal_Pollution_EPA_CID_Agent_Count.pdf.
31. Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Interdisciplinary Aspects of Environmental Enforcement, 36
ENV’T L. REP 10495, 10496-97 (2006).
32.

Id. at 10497.

33. Michael J. Lynch, The Sentencing/Punishment of Federal Environmental/Green Offenders, 20002013, 38 DEVIANT BEHAV. 991, 993 (2017); Criminal Enforcement: Special Agents, EPA (July 14, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-enforcement-special-agents; Memorandum from Earl E.
Devaney, Dir. of the EPA Off. of Crim. Enf’t, to All EPA Emps. Working in or in Support of the EPA
Crim. Enf’t Program (Jan. 12, 1994), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/exercise.pdf.
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environmental law in the United States are handled through civil remedies.34 Civil
measures focus on bringing violators into compliance with the law through a range
of civil or judicial actions, including restitution, injunctive relief, Administrative
Orders of Consent (AOC), environmental mitigation plans, or Supplemental
Environmental Projects (SEPs). 35
The question of importance becomes: to what degree can environmental
law enforcement agencies achieve their goals and what can be reasonably expected
from some four decades of back and forth since Reagan took office? Research
indicates that environmental law, in general, has become calcified from a lack of
congressional action over the last three decades, turning what was once innovation
into a growingly ineffectual system of regulation.36 Other work has noted that
environmental law enforcement agencies have persisted in achieving their
organizational goals within this environment but were increasingly out of gas and
“running on fumes” prior to the four-year onslaught of the Trump Administration.37
Research often points to the sheer lack of resources for EPA-CID and DOJECS to functionally achieve deterrence, with many studies arguing that resources are
simply too thin to provide general deterrence effects.38 The need for additional
resources has been ongoing.39 EPA-CID, for example, has suffered from a declining
number of special agents for years, often falling below the statutory minimum
number of agents. The number has continued to slide from 175 agents in 2012 down
to 145 by 2019.40 One study shows that prosecutions resulting from EPA-CID

34. See Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and Unpublished
Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7, 12-13 (1999).
35. BasicInformationonEnforcement,EPA(Feb.22,2022),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement.
36. Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Has Fallen ‘In Arrears’, HARVARD LAW TODAY (May 3,
2013),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/richard-lazarus-environmental-law-has-fallen-in-arrears-video/;
Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 15, 15-34 (2014).
37. See Joel A. Mintz, “Running on Fumes”: The Development of New EPA Regulations in an Era of
Scarcity, 46 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10510, 10511-13 (2016).
38. See Michael J. Lynch, Kimberly L. Barrett, Paul B. Stretesky, & Michael Long, The Weak
Probability of Punishment for Environmental Offenses and Deterrence of Environmental Offenders: A Discussion
Based on USEPA Criminal Cases, 1983-2013, 37 DEVIANT BEHAV. 1095, 1096-99 (2016) (discussing and
analyzing the probability of being punished for an environmental crime and the subsequent prospects for
deterrence); Mathew J. Griefe, Paul B. Stretesky, Tara. O. C. Shelley, & Matthew Pogrebin, Corporate
Environmental Crime and Environmental Justice, 28(4) CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 327, 346 (2017); see also
Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, Does the Criminal Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law Deter
Environmental Crime? The Case of the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 11 BARRY L. ENV'T &
EARTH L.J. 65, 73-87 (2021) (finding underfunded environmental criminal enforcement impacting
deterrence effect of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act prosecution); Lynch, supra note 33, at 1005
(discussing that discrepancies between "street" crime and environmental crime can be explained by less
stringent enforcement due to lack of environmental environment resources).
39. See Jennifer Koons, Wanted: Environmental Crime Fighters, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (July 30.
2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/environmental-law-enforcement-crimes-epa/.
40. EPA CID Agent Count, PUB. EMPLS. FOR ENV’T RESP. (2019), https://www.peer.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/11_21_19-Federal_Pollution_EPA_CID_Agent_Count.pdf.
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investigations number slightly less than 2,600 from 1983-2019.41 Other research
demonstrates that prosecutors focus on serious crimes that typically involve at least
one if not more aggregating factors, such as chronic offending, deceptive or
misleading conduct, or operating outside the boundaries of the regulatory system.42
Research on the relationship between presidential administrations and enforcement
outcomes shows that law enforcement agencies persist in achieving many of their
goals, despite presidential opposition.43
Trump’s threats to defund environmental agencies were not unique. His
actions follow decades of underinvestment in enforcement personnel and budgets,
despite growing environmental problems and regulatory responsibilities.44 The
addition of the 2009 financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic bring added
pressures to agency budgeting, despite promises by the Biden Administration to
focus resources in this area.45 We explore the criminal prosecution of air pollution
cases to see overall patterns in prosecutions and the output achieved under these
difficult circumstances.

II. DATA AND METHODS
We collected data from the EPA’s Summary of Criminal Prosecutions
Database.46 This database provides case summaries for all environmental crime
prosecutions resulting from EPA-CID criminal investigations from 1983 to present.
The database contains valuable information including a narrative summary of each
investigation, a timeline, indictment, case characteristics, and sentencing information
for all named defendants.
We searched the database for all cases by EPA fiscal year (FY) that runs
from October 1 to September 30 and chose all cases adjudicated during the Trump
Administration. The period of analysis runs from January 20, 2017 to President

41. This number includes some state prosecutions and may not include environmental crime
prosecutions undertaken without EPA collaboration, meaning the real number is likely higher, but it is
difficult to know the degree. See Ozymy et al., supra note 19, at 49-60.
42. For two important empirical studies here, see David M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 159, 159 (2014) and Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 312.
43. Ozymy et al., supra note 12, at 38-51; Joshua Ozymy & Melissa Jarrell, Why do Regulatory
Agencies Punish? The Impact of Political Principals, Agency Culture, and Transaction Costs in Predicting
Environmental Criminal Prosecution Outcomes in the United States, 33 REV. OF POL’Y RSCH. 71, 71-72 (2016).
44. Budgetary data for ENRD or EPA show a lack of expansion to even keep up with real inflation
over the years, not to mention expanded responsibilities. See Budget and Performance Summary ENRD
(Various Years), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/doj/budget-andperformance. EPA budget and staffing numbers show a decline in inflation adjusted dollars from the early
1980s and stagnant staff prior to Trump. See EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA (July 30, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget.
45. The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Opportunity, BIDEN
HARRIS CAMPAIGN (2021), https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/.
46. SummaryofCriminalProsecutionsDatabase,EPA(May10,2021),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/summary-criminal-prosecutions.
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Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021.47 We find 282 prosecutions occurring
during the Trump Administration. We read each case and selected those that focused
on air pollution crimes. This left us with 69 cases for the analysis.
We used content analysis to gather the data. We piloted our data gathering
protocols for four weeks to better understand and discern patterns in the data. Two
coders worked independently, meeting weekly to discuss results until inter-coder
reliability reached ninety percent. We then implemented our full coding protocols
with two coders gathering data and one of the authors reviewing the data for
discrepancies and meeting to come to a consensus on differing values. These
differences tended to occur with complex sentencing data or ambiguous entries in
the case summaries.
Inter-coder reliability for the study was approximately ninety-five
percent.48 Using additional resources would invalidate our ability to use the same
methodology for gathering and coding every case and would affect the reliability of
our data. Accordingly, we did not use legal or web-based sources to verify the data.
The database is our sole source of data for the analysis. If EPA did not include a
prosecution in the database or another agency undertook prosecution of a federal
environmental crime, either case would be unknown to us or not included in the
analysis. However, given EPA’s role in cooperating with DOJ environment crime
investigations, it is not likely that many cases, if any, were missing from the database.
The following data was coded from the summaries in Excel: 1) docket
identifier, 2) number of named defendants, 3) primary defendant name, 4) short
summary of each case, 5) presence of at least one company as a named defendant in
the case coded (1) Yes or (0) No, 6) presence of criminal charges including fraud,
smuggling, racketeering, false statements, or other crimes, 6) if defendants were
charged with a state-level environmental crime, 7) major federal environmental
statutes violated in the case, 8) state listed in the summary for where the primary
crime occurred, and 9) penalties. We measured penalties in the aggregate for all
individual defendants and company/corporate defendants in the case. Probation and
incarceration are measured in total months. Community service is measured in total
hours. Monetary penalties include all such penalties levied at sentencing, such as
assessments, restitution, fines, fees, or other penalties.

47. We took great care to exclude cases that were sentenced before or after Trump. When we
gathered the data, Timothy Patrick, State v. Patrick, Ohio 19 CR 75 (Dec. 23, 2020) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions), was the final case sentenced before January 20, 2021. Our analysis begins with
Christopher Dale Miller, United States v. Miller, No. 5:16-CR-205-1BO (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2016) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions). A few examples of cases excluded as examples here include Isaac
Cole, United States v. Cole, No. CR16-270JCC (W.D.Wash.Jan. 13, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal
Prosecutions), sentenced on January 13, 2017, and Omega Protein, United States. v. Omega Protein, Inc.,
No. 6:16-CR-00292 (W.D.La.Jan. 18, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions), sentenced on
January 18, 2017. There were 283 total cases we found that were adjudicated during Trump, but primary
defendant Mark Meyer, United States v. Meyer, No. 1:20-CR-00186 (D.N.D. Dec. 29, 2020) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions), is inaccurately listed twice in the Database. Once we selected the
cases for the full dataset, we read and extracted cases that focused on air pollution crimes.
48. We calculated this by dividing the agreed-upon items by non-agreed items. See OLE R.
HOLSTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 140 (Addison Wesley,
1969).
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III.RESULTS
Figure 1 displays the number of air pollution prosecutions adjudicated by
FY during the Trump Administration. In FY 2017, we estimate that 22 air pollution
prosecutions were adjudicated. That number decreased each year through the
Administration. In FY 2018, we find 18 prosecutions adjudicated, and this drops
again to 14 in FY 2019, 12 in FY 2020, and 3 in FY 2021, which is very low as this
year only includes the few remaining months of the Administration. Our data
indicates that 69 air pollution cases were prosecuted in the Trump Era following
EPA-CID criminal investigations, with an average of about 17 excluding FY 2021.
Figure 1. Total Air Pollution Prosecutions Adjudicated During the Trump
Administration by Fiscal Year
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Source: EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database
Figure 2 displays the total number of defendants that were prosecuted for
air pollution crimes by FY during the Trump Administration. In FY 2017, we found
41 defendants prosecuted for air pollution crimes. As with the number of annual
prosecutions adjudicated in Figure 1, the number of defendants prosecuted annually
begins a quick slide. In FY 2018, there were 21 defendants prosecuted, 19 in FY 2019,
and 19 in FY 2020. In total, we found that105 defendants were prosecuted for air
pollution crimes during this period.
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Figure 2. Total Defendants Prosecuted in Air Pollution Cases During the
Trump Administration by Fiscal Year
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Source: EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database
We examine charging patterns in Figure 3 for air pollution crimes
prosecuted during the Trump Administration. By an overwhelming margin,
prosecutors focused on charging criminals under the CAA for air pollution crimes.
In 67% of prosecutions, or 46 cases, a defendant was charged with a federal air
pollution crime under the CAA. In one case a defendant was prosecuted under
CERCLA.49 In one case a defendant was prosecuted under TSCA for an air pollution
crime.50 In the remaining 21 cases, defendants were prosecuted under various Title
18 and other criminal offenses.51

49. Dyno Nobel, Inc., United States v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., No. 3:18-CR-63-SI (D.Or. June 4,
2018) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions), was prosecuted for discharging six tons of anhydrous
ammonia into the ambient air around St. Helen’s, Oregon. The company was prosecuted under CERCLA
for failure to notify officials of the release of a hazardous substance and was sentenced to pay a $250,000
fine and serve two years of probation. Kenneth Baez-Alers, United States v. Baez-Alers, No. 3:15-CR-871
(D.P.R. Apr. 12, 2018) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions), was prosecuted as part of the broader
prosecution of AIREKO Construction that engaged in the illegal disposal of asbestos during renovation
of a building in Puerto Rico. The defendant was prosecuted under the CAA for the asbestos violation and
CERCLA for failure to notify officials of the release of a hazardous substance. We felt the primary crime
was prosecuted under the CAA instead of CERCLA and categorized it accordingly, although it could be
placed primarily under CERCLA as well. Baez-Alers was sentenced to serve twelve months of probation.
50. Paul Potter, United States v. Potter, No. 19-CR-00106 (E.D.Va. Aug. 9, 2019) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions), plead guilty to violations of TSCA for overseeing the improper
removal of asbestos from 530 apartments in Virginia. Some tenants occupied the units while the removal
was being undertaken and some workers were neither protected nor certified to do the work, which was
undertaken without proper precautions. Potter was sentenced to twelve months of probation and a $15,000
criminal fine.
51. Title 18 is the primary criminal code of the United States federal government. See U.S. Code
Title 18, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18.
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Figure 3. Charging Patterns in Air Pollution Prosecutions During the
Trump Administration
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Source: EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database
In Figure 4, we explore common criminal charges in air pollution
prosecutions during the Trump Administration. In a significant number of cases, at
least one defendant was charged with a criminal offense, either exclusively or in
addition to their environmental offense. As an indicator of the seriousness of the
crimes that were prosecuted by DOJ in our dataset, these numbers suggest such
prosecutions were common. In 24 prosecutions, or 35% of the prosecutions in our
analysis, at least one of the defendants was charged with conspiracy. In 22% of the
prosecutions, at least one defendant was charged with fraud. In 19% of prosecutions,
at least one defendant was charged with false statements, compared to 4% involving
money laundering and 3% involving theft.52 Altogether, in 41 cases or 59% of
prosecutions, at least one defendant was charged with at least one non-environmental
crime, showing a strong commitment to prosecute cases with aggregating factors that
indicate serious violations of law.53

52. Defendants can be charged with more than one of these crimes in a prosecution. For example,
while in 35% of cases at least one defendant was charged with conspiracy, one or more defendants could
have additionally been charged with fraud or theft.
53. For two important studies on this topic, see Uhlmann, supra note 42, at 159 and Uhlmann,
supra note 11, at 312.
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Figure 4. Common Criminal Charges in Air Pollution Prosecutions During
the Trump Administration
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Source: EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database
We move from an analysis in Figure 4 that examines some of the trends in
more serious offenses in our data, to the question of whether prosecutors were able
to secure significant penalties in air pollution prosecutions undertaken during the
Trump Administration. Figure 5 examines total penalties assessed to all individual
defendants and company/corporate defendants. We break these penalties down into
total monetary penalties assessed at sentencing in current U.S. dollars, total
probation assessed in months, incarceration in months, and hours of community
service. We estimate that $118 million dollars in monetary penalties were assessed to
individual defendants in air pollution prosecutions. Companies were sentenced to
pay over $2.8 billion in penalties. Total probation assessed to individuals equaled
1,506 months and 408 months assessed to companies. Individual defendants were
sentenced to 1,756 months of incarceration, and defendants were cumulatively
sentenced to 506 hours of community service. Cumulatively, defendants were
sentenced to pay $2.97 billion in monetary penalties and 305 years of probation and
incarceration.
Figure 5. Total Penalties Assessed to Defendants in Air Pollution Prosecutions
During the Trump Administration

Total Monetary Penalties
Individuals- $118,170,591
Companies- $2,859,666,322

Total Probation
Individuals- 1,506 Months
Companies- 408 Months

Incarceration
1,756 Months

Community Service
1,660 Hours

Source: EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database
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Securing almost $3 billion in penalties and 305 years of probation in parole
at sentencing is a laudable accomplishment for prosecutors that worked under the
auspices of the Trump Administration, as well as the Covid-19 pandemic. Our results
show that criminal investigators and prosecutors predominately pursued cases
involving serious violations of law. We turn to placing these penalties in context.
Five prosecutions against Volkswagen AG, IAV Gmbh, Power Plant Management
Services, Harcros Chemicals, and Keystone Biofuels, are used as examples of
corporate prosecutions involving large penalties.
Volkswagen AG was prosecuted for its systematic efforts to sell diesel
vehicles in the United States with software designed to cheat emissions testing.54
IAV Gmbh was also prosecuted for their role in helping to engineer systems in the
Volkswagen emissions rigging scheme and was ordered to pay a $35 million criminal
penalty.55 Power Plant Management Services and Berkshire Power Company were
prosecuted for tampering with air emissions controls and submitting false statements,
resulting in over $7.2 million in fines, penalties, and community service payments.56
Harcros Chemicals was prosecuted for the release of a toxic cloud of chlorine gas that
caused approximately 140 individuals to seek medical attention and both the
company and MGP Ingredients were each fined $1 million.57 Keystone Biofuels was
prosecuted for fraudulently claiming to produce biofuel to create sellable renewable
fuel credits (RINs) and claim federal tax refunds.58 The company was sentenced to
pay over $4.1 million in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and over
$5 million in restitution.59
While these cases represent the largest corporate penalties in our study,
monetary penalties against companies are heavily influenced by the $2.8 billion
criminal penalty assessed to Volkswagen AG. Absent that penalty alone, monetary
penalties assessed to companies drop to a much less significant $59 million.
Excluding the four cases above that total over $53 million, penalties drop to about
$5.4 million. The top five monetary penalties assessed at sentencing to individual
defendants totaled over $76 million. All but one of these prosecuted focused on
biofuel production fraud. Excluding these cases brings the total penalties assessed to

54. United States v. Volkswagen AG, No. 16-CR-20394 ¶ 2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2017) (Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions Database). The company was sentenced to pay a $2.8 billion criminal penalty
for violations of the CAA, conspiracy to defraud the United States, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and
importation of vehicles into the country by means of false statements.
55. United States v. IAV GmbH, No. 16-CR-20394 ¶ 1 (E.D.Mich.May 22, 2019) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database).
56. United States v. Power Plant Management Services, No. 3:16-CR-30021-MGM ¶ 9
(D.Mass.Mar. 23, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database).
57. United States v. Harcros Chemicals, No. 19-40021-01/02/-HLT (D.Kan. May 27, 2020)
(EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database).
58. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Pennsylvania Biofuel Company Owners Get Prison, INDUSTRIAL
EQUIPMENT NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.ien.com/regulation/news/21199423/pennsylvaniabiofuel-company-owners-get-prison.
59. United States v. Keystone Biofuels, Inc., No. 17:143 (M.D.Pa.Oct. 20, 2020) (EPA Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions Database).
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individual defendants to a much lower figure of $42 million.60 Total probation and
incarceration penalties were more evenly dispersed with fewer outliers than
monetary penalties.61
Our final analysis in Figure 6 brings us to move beyond charging and
sentencing patterns and an analysis of whether prosecutors sought and obtained
significant penalties for serious crimes, to a discussion of the nature of the
prosecutions themselves during the Trump Administration. We reanalyzed the cases
to assess, what is in our judgment, to be the major theme of each prosecution, based
on what we perceive as the primary crime in the case. In our analysis of the cases, we
were able to categorize all prosecutions into one of four categories which we label as:
asbestos crimes, vehicle emissions crimes, renewable fuel crimes, and operations
crimes.62

60. These cases include the prosecution of Scott Johnson, who was prosecuted for his role in the
Gen-X Energy fraud case, where the company claimed to produce some 72 million renewable energy
credits that sold for $57 million on the open market and claimed over $9.5 million in tax refunds from the
IRS. United States v. Johnson, No. 4:15-CR-6042-SMJ (E.D.Wash. Jun. 1, 2017) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database). Donald Paul Holmes was prosecuted as Johnson’s co-conspirator in a
separate case involved with the Gen-X biofuel fraud. United States v. Homes, No. 4:15-CR-6044-SMJ-1
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Andre Mark Bernard
was prosecuted in a related case. United States v. Bernard, No. 2:17-CR-61-FTM-38MRM (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 6, 2018) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Gregory Schnabel was prosecuted in
Ohio for a similar biofuel production crime. United States v. Schnabel, No. 2:17-CR-169 (S.D.Ohio Aug.
27, 2018) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Christopher Gattarello was prosecuted for
illegal asbestos demolition under the CAA and Title 18 offenses relating to false statements and fraud.
United States v. Gattarello, No. 1:14-CR-353 (N.D. Ohio July 7, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal
Prosecutions Database).
61. Community service was skewed by a few prosecutions. James Powers, United States v. Powers,
No. 1:2016cr00076 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database), and Larry
Miller, United States v. Miller, No. 1:2015cr00163 (D.D.C. May 19, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal
Prosecutions), were sentenced to 450 hours of community service for illegal asbestos abatement and
disposal. Philip Farley, United States v. Farley, No. 8:15-CR-00133 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2018) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database), was prosecuted for illegal asbestos abatement and
sentenced to 300 hours of community service. Jacob Lee Davis, United States v. Davis, No. 2:2019cr00201
(D.Wyo. June 9, 2020) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecution Database), was also prosecuted for illegal
asbestos abatement and he and his co-defendant Richard Cutler, United States v. Cutler, No. 2:2020-cr00027 (D. Wyo. Aug. 26, 2020) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database), were sentenced to
serve 120 hours of community service. The Powers and Miller, Farley, and Davis cases are responsible for
60% of the community service hours assessed to defendants at sentencing in our data.
62. Three cases centered on crimes involving refrigerants are not included in Figure 6. This
includes the prosecution of Michael Wagner, State v. Wagner, La. No. C-1305-16 (Jun. 6, 2017) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database), who illegally sold propane gas as a refrigerant and
replacement for Freon. This also includes the prosecution of Byron Stuckey, United States v. Stuckey,
No. 6:2015cr10022 (D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database), who stole
an air conditioning unit and releasing a refrigerant into the ambient air. Mahmoud Mohamed Alkabbani,
United States v. Alkabbani, No. 2:2017cr00311 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2018) (EPA Summary of Criminal
Prosecutions Database), was prosecuted for attempting to import R-22, a banned refrigerant from China,
that was fraudulently labeled R-134a, a legal refrigerant.
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Figure 6. Themes in Air Pollution Prosecutions During the Trump Administration

Asbestos Crime

Vehicle Emissions Crime

39%

19%

Renewable Fuel Crime

Operations Crime

26%

12%

Source: EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database
The most common air pollution offense was related to the removal of
asbestos containing materials (ACMs), including unpermitted demolition of
buildings containing asbestos, abatement, disposal, or failure to protect and certify
workers engaging in asbestos removal work. Asbestos is regulated under the CAA as
a hazardous air pollutant (HAP) and given that unpermitted removal can release
asbestos into the ambient air, it provides one of the few air emissions regulated by
EPA that leaves persistent physical evidence.63 Asbestos National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants rules are in force for owners of a stationary source
containing asbestos, demolition or renovation work where asbestos is present,
including rules for workers and work place standards for removal of ACM.64 Thirtynine percent of air pollution prosecutions (i.e. 27 total prosecutions) adjudicated
during the Trump Era focus on asbestos, making it the most prevalent theme
amongst all air pollution prosecutions in our analysis. Case examples classified as
asbestos crimes include the examples of Joseph Chernis, Stephen J. Craig, and
Cornerstone Management Professionals.
Joseph Chernis was prosecuted for hiring an untrained individual to remove
asbestos pipe insulation.65 He was charged under the CAA for illegal demolition and
removal of asbestos and sentenced to thirty-seven months incarceration and three

63. For rules governing asbestos as a HAP, see Overview of the Asbestos National Emissions Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants, EPA (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.epa.gov/asbestos/overview-asbestosnational-emission-standards-hazardous-air-pollutants-neshap.
64. CriminalProvisionsoftheCleanAirAct,EPA(Feb.9,2021),
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/criminal-provisions-clean-air-act.
65. United States v. Chernis, No. 3:16-cr-30033 (C.D.Ill. Feb. 5, 2018) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database).
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years of supervised release.66 Stephen J. Craig, owner of Boston Lead Company, was
prosecuted for fraudulently issuing lead-based paint and asbestos removal
certifications.67 Craig was sentenced to six months imprisonment, three years of
supervised release, and a $20,000 fine.68 Cornerstone Management Professionals
abated asbestos in a condominium clubhouse without giving the required ten-day
notice to authorities as required by law, dumped the waste in a non-permitted
landfill, and sending altered lab reports to officials showing a minimum amount of
asbestos.69 Cornerstone and its owner Robert Walsh were also charged with wire
fraud in connection with an attempt to defraud the homeowners’ association and was
sentenced to fifteen months incarceration, three years supervised release, a $125,000
fine, and joint and several restitution totaling $247,413.70
We label 26% of prosecutions or 18 prosecutions as renewable fuel crimes.
These crimes were generally perpetuated in an effort to defraud the Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) program created under the Energy Independence and Policy Act of
2005, which required a certain volume of petroleum-based fuel to be replaced with
biofuels or biomass-based diesel.71 Many of these crimes are prosecuted under the
CAA because they involve defrauding the renewable fuel program and came under
the purview of CAA regulations. We included all of these cases as air pollution
prosecutions as they were related to the general theme of defrauding the program,
even if defendants were ultimately not charged under the CAA. In all cases, the
prosecutions rested on defendants pretending to create a certain volume of biofuels
in order to either generate renewable energy credits to sell to other producers that
failed to produce enough biofuel to meet the federal standard, and/or fraudulently
claim federal production tax credits for biofuel that was never produced.72 We

66. Crystal Thomas, Chernis Gets Sentenced to More Than Three Years in Prison in Pillsbury Asbestos
Case, THE STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2018, 11:28 AM CT), https://www.sjr.com/story/news/2018/02/05/chernis-sentenced-to-more-than/15310444007/.
67. United States v. Craig, No. 3:12-cr-269AW (D.Conn.Dec. 7, 2017) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database).
68. U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Connecticut, Environmental Training Company Owner
to Serve Prison Time for Falsely Certifying Lead Abatement Course Completion, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 7,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/environmental-training-company-owner-serve-prison-timefalsely-certifying-lead-abatement.
69. United States v. Cornerstone Mgmt. Pro., No. 16-CR-02872-BTM (S.D.Cal.May 4, 2018)
(EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database).
70. Id.; U.S. ATT’Y OFF. FOR THE S.D. CAL., Property Manager and Firm Charged with Defrauding
Homeowners’ Association for $247,000, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Dec. 12, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/property-manager-and-firm-charged-defrauding-homeownersassociation-247000.
71. Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standardprogram/overview-renewable-fuel-standard.
72. As mentioned in our previous discussion of large penalty monetary assessments in air pollution
prosecutions, because it was relatively simple to fraudulently claim a significant volume of biofuel
production to sell RINs and claim production tax credits, the fines and restitution tended to be high in
many of these cases. Our estimates of individual fines totals are heavily skewed towards cases in this
category. We estimate that total monetary fines to individual defendants in this category equal
$107,058,279 or 91% of the total individual fines assessed to all individual defendants in our analysis.
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provide some examples of this category with the prosecution of Jin Chul Cha, Terry
Zintel, and Calvin Glover.
Jin Chul Cha was prosecuted for his role in the Gen-X Energy Group
criminal conspiracy to falsely claim more than 9,400,000 renewable energy credits
and filling false claims with the IRS for over $2.5 million in tax refunds.73 Terry
Zintel, co-owner of Midwest Biodiesel Products in Roxanna, Illinois, was prosecuted
for claiming fraudulent excise tax refunds for the production of biofuel.74 Calvin
Glover was prosecuting for his role in filling $7.2 million in false tax rebate claims to
the IRS for production of biofuel as part of the prosecution of Shintan, Inc.75
In 13 prosecutions or 19% of the air pollution prosecutions in our analysis
are categorized as vehicle emissions crimes. These crimes centered on a few specific
crimes, such as falsifying emissions testing data, using technology to produce
fraudulent emissions testing results or to modify emissions equipment, and illegal
importation of non-conforming vehicles. The previously mentioned prosecution of
Volkswagen AG for its emissions rigging fraud falls in this category, as does the
related prosecution of the engineering firm engaged in the company’s conspiracy to
cheat emissions testing equipment, IAV GmbH.76 Case examples to contextualize
prosecutions in this category include the prosecution of Darren Daniel Kattan, Jaime
Patrick Alvarez, Wayne Joseph Powell, and Hyundai Construction Equipment
Americas.
Darren Daniel Kattan was prosecuted for building and distributing some
170 devices to bypass state vehicle emissions inspections tests and was subsequently
charged with violating the CAA and conspiring to commit mail fraud.77 Jaime Patrick
Alvarez along with eight co-defendants was prosecuted for circumventing
California’s Smog Check emissions testing by clean piping 1,300 vehicles that passed
emissions tests but were never actually tested.78 Wayne Joseph Powell was in charge
73. United States v. Cha, No. 4:17-CR6046-SMJ (E.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2018) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database). Cha was sentenced to a fifty-one month prison term and three years of
probation.
74. United States v. Zintel, No. 4:18WI13HEA (D.Mo. Apr. 17, 2019) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database). Zintel was sentenced to one year and a day in prison and $531,947.75
in restitution to the IRS.
75. United States v. Glover, No. 1:18-cr-00346 (D.Colo. Oct. 28, 2021) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database).
76. Volkswagen engineer James Robert Liang was also prosecuted for his role in the conspiracy,
being sentenced to forty months in federal prison and two years of probation. United States v. Liang, No.
16-CR-20394 (E.D.Mich.Aug. 25, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Oliver
Schmidt, United States v. Schmidt, No. 16-cr-20394 (E.D.Mich., Dec. 6, 2017) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database), was the general manager of the company’s U.S. Environment and
Engineering Office and was sentenced to eighty-four months incarceration and to pay a $400,000 fine for
his role in the conspiracy.
77. United States v. Kattan, No. 5:16-CR-327(NAM) (N.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017) (EPA Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Kattan was sentenced to three years of probation with the first four
months as house arrest and a $10,000 fine.
78. United States v. Alvarez, No. cr-2016-0049 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 7, 2017) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database). Alvarez was sentenced to twenty-four months of probation for
conspiring to violate the CAA. Clean piping is when an individual substitutes a passing vehicle’s emissions
data for one that does not pass, by placing the testing probe in a tailpipe of another vehicle. See Underhood
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of submitting certificates of conformity for emissions compliance for motorcycles
manufactured by Suzuki Motor Corporation and was prosecuted for submitting false
data in reports to government regulators.79 Hyundai Construction Equipment
Americas was prosecuted for conspiring to defraud the United States government
and violate the CAA for knowingly importing non-conforming construction
equipment.80
The final eight prosecutions, or 12% of the air pollution prosecutions in the
analysis, focused on what we label as operational crimes. These are air pollution
crimes that typically involve CAA violations at stationary sources of pollution that
emitted regulated emissions in excess of their Title V permits or similar violations.81
The previously mentioned prosecutions of Harcros Chemicals, Dyno Nobel, and
Power Plant Management Services fall within this category. We provide a few
additional examples for context in this category with the prosecutions of Syntac
Coated Products, Mark Hurst, and Raymond Williams.
Syntac Coated Products was prosecuted for failing to report that its
emissions equipment was not functioning properly and on multiple occasions could
have likely released hazardous emissions in excess of permitted limits.82 Mark Hurst,
the plant manager at Custom Carbon Processing was prosecuted after a delivery of
natural gas condensate exploded, destroying much of the facility and injuring three
workers.83 Raymond Williams, the CEO of U.S. Technology Corporation, was
prosecuted for conspiring to illegally ship nine million pounds of hazardous waste for
their facility, as well as placing a person in imminent danger by releasing hazardous
waste into the ambient air.84

Service Staff Writers, California Cracking Down on Smog Test Facilities ‘Clean Piping’ Smog Checks,
UNDERHOOD SERVICE (June 16, 2010), https://www.underhoodservice.com/california-cracking-downon-smog-test-facilities-clean-piping-smog-checks/.
79. United States v. Powell, No. 2:17-CR-20374 (E.D.Mich. Dec. 14, 2017) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database). Powell was sentenced to one day in prison, one year of probation, and
a $2,500 fine.
80. United States v. Hyundai Constr. Equip. Am. (No.1:18-CR-00379 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2018)
(EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). The company was sentenced to pay $1,950,000 in
federal fines.
81. The CAA requires major sources of stationary pollution to possess current operational permits,
known as Title V permits. See Operating Permits Issued under Title V of the Clean Air Act, EPA (Dec. 28,
2020), https://www.epa.gov/title-v-operating-permits.
82. United States v. Syntac Coated Prod., No. 3:17CR10 (D.Conn.Jan. 19, 2017) (EPA Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions Database). The company was charged with failure to notify officials of the release
of hazardous emissions under the CAA and was ordered to pay a $200,000 fine and make a $200,000
community service payment.
83. United States v. Hurst, No. CR 17-143-BLG-SPW (D.Mont.July 15, 2020) (EPA Summary
of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Hurst was sentenced to two years of probation, a $5,000 fine, and
$12,000 in restitution.
84. United States v. Williams, No. 4:17-CR-00189-RWS-PLC (E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2019) (EPA
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). Williams and UST were both sentenced to sixty months
of probation and joint restitution with other parties in the case of $1,500,000.
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IV.CONCLUSION
Our analysis of air pollution demonstrates the ability to prosecutors to
persist in pursuing serious crimes, as well as securing significant punishments at
sentencing. The Trump Administration did not stop career prosecutors and criminal
investigators from pursuing difficult cases or from meeting their organizational
objectives. Even though career civil servants persisted in their efforts, according to
previous research, prosecutions during this period were significantly reduced in
number compared to previous presidential administrations.85 We find prosecutions
declined in a linear fashion across each FY in our analysis. The broader picture that
emerges supports past research that environmental law enforcement agencies can
persist through difficult presidential administrations but shows a significant decline
in those efforts.86 We conclude with an elaboration on some of these key findings,
followed by practical solutions to improve federal environmental law enforcement in
the United States.
Our first finding is that air pollution prosecutions declined during the
Trump period. In fiscal year (FY) 2017, there were 22 prosecutions adjudicated, but
these slipped to 12 by FY 2020. The total number of defendants prosecuted followed
a similar pattern. In FY 2017, 41 defendants were prosecuted and by FY 2021, that
number dropped to 19. These declining numbers mirror earlier work during this
period, even considering the realities of Covid-19 for prosecuting environmental
crimes.87
We find that prosecutors pursued serious violations of environmental law.
As an indicator, a third of prosecutions involved charges such as conspiracy or fraud.
In 19% of air pollution prosecutions, at least one defendant was charged with false
statements. In 59% of all air pollution prosecutions, at least one defendant was
charged with a Title 18 or other crime other than an environmental crime. As with
previous research, using this as one metric, a majority of crimes in our analysis
involved some contributing factor in addition to an environmental crime. 88 While
we could not systematically glean these factors from the EPA’s case summaries,
research on environmental crimes shows these to be chronic violators, willful
conduct, operating outside of the regulatory system, or other aggregating factors.89
Another key takeaway from our analysis is that while prosecutors did secure
significant penalties in air pollution prosecutions, and those include large penalty
cases secured at trial against large national and international corporations, and while
these are all measures of success, a few key cases significantly skew the aggregate
results. Corporate penalties are heavily skewed by Volkswagen AG’s prosecution.
Total penalties levied against companies is reduced from a handsome $2.859 billion

85. For research analyzing environmental crime prosecutions during the first half of the Trump
Era, see Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 314-20.
86.

Ozymy et al., supra note 19, at 49-60.

87.

See Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 312-20; Ozymy et al., supra note 12, at 38-45.

88. Research shows that 96% of defendants prosecuted for environmental crimes had at least one
aggregating variable attached to the act. See Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 312.
89.

See Uhlmann, supra note 42, at 159.
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to only $59 million, excluding that one case alone.90 The ability of prosecutors to
secure the second largest penalty in an environmental crime prosecution during the
Trump Administration and to continue to seek these penalties is laudable, but
otherwise, air pollution prosecutions generally turn up minor penalties against
companies with a few noted exceptions.91 Monetary penalties levied against
individuals are heavily influenced by renewable fuel crimes, as well.92
There has never been a golden era of federal environmental law
enforcement. The criminal enforcement apparatus evolved due to the need to
investigate and punish crimes involving significant harm and culpable conduct and
developed incrementally through the 1980s-1990s.93 It was running on fumes by the
Obama Era, due to increased responsibilities, miserly financial support, and hostile
political opposition.94 The Biden Administration has expressed strong support for
addressing environmental injustice in the United States through appropriations to
EPA, DOJ, and other relevant federal agencies.95 We suggest that environmental
justice can be better addressed and environmental criminal enforcement significantly
renewed through additional resources, listening to environmental justice
communities and engaging them in community policing efforts, and for prosecutors
to further pursue recognition of environmental justice communities as victims of
crime in federal court.
Enhancing resources for environmental law enforcement is long overdue.
For example, Congress set the minimum number of EPA criminal investigators at
200 agents in 1990 and has this number lapsed significantly since the George W.
Bush Administration. Hiring sufficient criminal investigators in EPA-CID to meet
the statutory minimum is desperately needed and the Biden Administration should
invest in additional criminal investigators to offset the historical slide away from
supporting environmental policing efforts.96 For DOJ-ECS to address
90. The prosecution of BP for their role in causing the Deepwater Horizon disaster was the largest
penalty secured by environmental crime prosecutors. U.S. v. BP Exp. and Prod., No. 2:12-cr-002920SSVDEK (E.D.La. Nov. 15, 2012) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database). BP was ordered to
pay $4 billion in criminal fines. Volkswagen agreed to plead guilty and pay a $2.8 billion criminal penalty.
U.S. v. Volkswagen AG, No. 16-CR-20394 (E.D. Mich., Apr. 21, 2017) (EPA Summary of Criminal
Prosecutions Database).
91. Excluding the second largest penalties levied against Power Plant Management Services, U.S.
v. Power Plant Mgmt. Serv., No. 3:16-CR-30021-MGM (D.Mass. Mar. 23, 2017) (EPA Summary of
Criminal Prosecutions Database), and IAV GmbH, U.S. v. IAV GmbH, No. 16-CR-20394 (E.D.Mich.
May 22, 2019) (EPA Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database), ($7.2 and $35 million respectively),
as well as the Volkswagen prosecution reduces total corporate monetary penalties to about $17.4 million.
Supra note 56; supra note 55.
92. We estimated that total monetary fines to individual defendants in this category equal
$107,058,279 or 91% of the total individual fines assessed to all individual defendants in our analysis.
93.

See Mintz, supra note 13, at 10390, 10408; Mintz, supra note 37, at 10510-19.

94. See Mintz, supra note 37; Earl E. Devaney, The Exercise of Investigative Discretion, EPA (Jan.
12, 1994), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/exercise.pdf.
95. See The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Opportunity, BIDEN
HARRIS CAMPAIGN (2020) https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/.
96. The Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 202(a)(5), created a statutory minimum
at 200 investigative staff for EPA-CID. Meeting this threshold has not occurred for years. See EPA CID
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environmental harms existing in environmental justice communities, forty
something attorneys is insufficient to manage the scale of the problem.97 Creating a
general deterrent effect when environmental law enforcement numbers are so low is
a near impossibility.98 DOJ-ECS needs to hire dedicated investigators and
prosecutors to shore up resources and prevent companies from polluting the
fenceline.
Added investigators and prosecutors will not automatically improve
community relations. Any efforts to increase environmental law enforcement staff
should be met with parallel efforts to engage the communities they will serve. One
potential effort could be to integrate communities into community policing efforts.99
Expanding small grants to organize air monitoring and policing of industrial facilities
is a start, particularly in environmental justice communities, where EPA small grant
programs are already in place.100 Empowering environmental justice communities to
help with policing efforts requires more time, but in our own experience working in
these communities locally on a large federal environmental crime prosecution, it was
critical in successfully prosecuting and convicting a multinational corporation.101 Our
analysis of air pollution crimes shows that during Trump Administration, very few
companies were punished for operational crimes involving unpermitted emissions
that violated the CAA. Protecting environmental justice communities from
environmental crimes requires law enforcement agencies to step up their efforts
significantly in this area if they are to police the large industrial facilities that injure
nearby communities.
A final effort for the Biden Administration to address environmental
injustice through environmental enforcement, is to push prosecutors to seek
recognition of environmental justice communities as crime victims under the Crime
Victims’ Rights Act.102 A handful of cases have applied the Act to environmental

Agent Count, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (PEER) (2019),
https://www.peer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/11_21_19-Federal_Pollution_EPA_CID_Agent_Cou
nt.pdf; see also Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Pollution Prosecution Plunge
Continues under Biden, PEER (Jan. 24, 2022), https://peer.org/pollution-prosecution-plunge-continuesunder-biden/
97. The number of prosecutors and environmental police make the probability of criminal
punishment or detection terribly low. See Lynch et al., supra note 38, at 1096-98.
98. See PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (PEER), EPA CID Agent
Count,https://www.peer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/11_21_19-Federal_Pollution_EPA_CID_Agen
t_Count.pdf.
99. EPA can broaden participation in its Report a Violation program targeted at fenceline
communities.SeeCriminalEnforcementProgram,EPA6-7(2011),
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/oceft-overview-2011.pdf.
100. Such programs already exist but could be expanded. See Environmental Justice Small Grants
Program, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/environmental-justice-small-grants-program.
101. For a truncated synopsis of our own work in this area, see Joshua Ozymy and Melissa Jarrell,
Righting and “Writing” Wrongs: A Postmortem on a Decade of Environmental Justice Activism in Corpus Christi,
Texas, 11 ENV’T JUST. 23, 23-31(2019).
102. The movement to expand the rights of crime victims has been occurred at the state and federal
level in the United States since the 1980s. See William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in
Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976); David L. Roland, Progress in
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crime victims, and in a limited fashion to environmental justice communities.103
Unless corporate polluters near the fenceline face significant damages in restitution
to their victims and unless prosecutors push to have these victims properly
recognized in federal court, it will be difficult to deter corporate polluters,
successfully police and prosecute offenders, and reduce environmental harms in
fenceline communities.104

the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the “Forgotten Victim”, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 36 (1989); Douglas
E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. UNIV. L. REV.
1135 (2007); see also Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (granting procedural rights to victims of
crime). For an overview of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, see Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, BYU L. REV. 835
(2005); Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, UTAH L. REV. 861 (2007). In 2018, President Trump signed the Amy, Vicky & Andy Child
Pornography Victim Assistance Act that addressed victim restitution and other issues in child
pornography case. See Paul G. Cassell & James R. Marsh, The New Amy, Vicky, and Andy Act: A Positive
Step Towards Full Restitution for Child Pornography Victims, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 9 (2009). A movement to
secure greater rights for crime victims across the U.S. States, known as the Marsy’s Law Movement has
gained significant traction in the last five years. See About Marsy’s Law, MARSY’S LAW,
https://www.marsyslaw.us/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021); Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The
Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, UTAH L. REV. 1373 (1994); Paul G. Cassell &
Margaret Garvin, Protecting Crime Victims in State Constitutions: The Example of the New Marsy’s Law for
Florida 110 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99, 104-05 (2020).
103. Melissa L. Jarrell & Joshua Ozymy, Real Crime, Real Victims: Environmental Crime Victims and
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 58 CRIM., L. & SOC. CHANGE, 375 (2012).
104. For a broader treatment of environmental justice communities as potential communities of
victims under state and federal law, see Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, 2020, Of Sex Crimes and
Fencelines: How Recognition of Environmental Justice Communities as Crime Victims Under State and Federal
Law Can Help Secure Environmental Justice, 38 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 109, 109-40 (2020).

